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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: A BAR TO AWARDS OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN SUITS AGAINST STATE OFFICIALS?
INTRODUCTION

In recent years federal courts have utilized expanding equitable doctrines to award attorneys' fees to successful litigants in a
variety of cases.' However, a conflict develops when equity would
permit an award of attorneys' fees, but the losing party is a state
official protected by the state's immunity through the eleventh
amendment.2 The eleventh amendment was enacted to provide
limited sovereign immunity for the state, or specifically, to protect the state from suits by citizens for payment of debts owed by
the state.3 The purpose of the amendment was to insure that the
functions of state government would not be disturbed by claims
affecting the state treasury.4 To assure this result, the amendment provides a jurisdictional limitation on the federal courts to
prevent such claims from being brought.
Although this immunity seems absolute, it was limited by the
Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Young,' which held that
state officials acting outside the scope of the Constitution may be
sued in federal court. The holding in Ex parte Young created a
1. Three basic theories in equity have been held to justify awards of
attorneys' fees. Two of the theories, the common benefit theory and the
bad faith theory, continue to allow fee awards. The third, the private attorney general theory, has recently been restricted in use by the Supreme
Court through Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., U.S. -,
96 S. Ct. 1612 (1975). For cases awarding attorneys' fees under each of these
theories see notes 20, 31, 39 and 40 infra.
2. The eleventh amendment provides that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U,S. CONST. amend. XI. This amendment limits the suits that may be brought
against a state in federal court limiting the possible claims on the state
treasury.
3. The eleventh amendment was passed in reaction to Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which held that a state was liable for
payment of a debt.
4. See Pardon v. Terminal R.R. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964); Mathis,
The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REv. 207
(1972); Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment-Lower Court
Interpretations and the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEo. L.J. 1473 (1972);
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1, 23 (1963).
5. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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new avenue for litigating claims against the state. One possible
claim could be for an award of attorneys' fees against defendant
state officials which would be payable from the state treasury.
This note will analyze the conflicting interests involved in awarding attorneys' fees against defendant state officials in light of the
immunity imparted by the eleventh amendment to demonstrate that
this amendment does not bar such awards against state officials.
AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES

Historically, the English rule of awarding attorneys' fees has
differed from the American rule. In England, a successful litigant's right to costs and counsel fees was created in 1278 by the
Statute of Gloucester." Later acts' extended such awards to a point
where English courts were assuming the power to award reasonable
attorneys' fees in an effort to "make the prevailing party whole.'"
This power was not assumed by the courts in America, where the
rule developed that attorneys' fees were not "ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing
therefor."'
Many arguments have been advanced in support of the American rule denying awards of attorneys' fees. The main contention
is that assessing attorneys' fees against the losing parties penalizes
them, with the future effect of discouraging them from bringing suits to vindicate their rights.' Accordingly the fact that the
6. 6 Edw. 1, c. 1 stating that "costs of his writ purchased" were to be
paid the winning party. This phrase was construed to include all costs of
the lawsuit, including counsel fees. See also Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALz L.J.
849, 853 (1929).
7. Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. See Judicature Act of 1875, ached.
1, providing that "the costs of and incident to all proceedings in the High
Court shall be in the discretion of the Court."
8. 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77(2) at 1703 (2d ed. 1966). See
also Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 854 (1929); and McCormick, Counsel
Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation As An Element of Damages, 15 MINN.
L. REv. 619, 620 (1931).
9. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717
(1967). The American rule was first stated in Arcambel v. Wiserman, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
10.
The possibility of having to pay the lawyer's bills of both parties
to the action makes a plaintiff think twice before he sues out a writ
and a defendant think twice before he defends an action which ought
not to be defended, and that is a direct deterrent on the number of
cases put or kept in suit.
From the First Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, 1925, as
reported in Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 876 (1929). See also McCorhttps://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/6
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litigant brought a losing suit is not wrong, and so he should not
be assessed with the opposition's attorneys' fees merely for having
done so." Another factor lending support to the denial of attorneys'
fees is the possible administrative problem in determining an
amount of attorneys' fees which is reasonable under the circumstances. 2 Finally, it had been asserted that attorneys' fees are too
"remote, future, and contingent" to be included in costs awarded
the successful litigant."
Whether or not these arguments are valid, the general rule
continues to dominate American courts-in the absence of contract or statute, attorneys' fees are not awarded to the successful
party. Many courts have, however, carved out a limited exception
to this rule by permitting such awards "when overriding considerations of justice seem to compel such a result."" This equitable exception developed from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank," in which he stated that attorneys' fees are allowable in appropriate situations as part of
the "historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts."" Justice
Frankfurter referred to the English practice of allowing awards of
attorneys' fees as part of the Chancellor's authority to provide
equity. Through Sprague this equitable option was established in
mick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation As An Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 639 (1931) (a litigant having a reasonable doubt
as to the validity of his claim should not be penalized for bringing it).
11. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,
718 (1967) (award of attorney's fees denied because the statute under which
the suit was brought, detailed the relief available, and attorney's fees were
not included).
12.
The time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating
the question of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees would pose
substantial burdens for judicial administration.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
The idea that determining what constitutes reasonable attorneys' fees would
present administrative problems was emphasized early in Oelrichs v. Spain,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872).
13.
[T~he expenses of litigation are never damages sued for in any
case when the action is brought for the wrong itself, not even if the
tort be wanton or malicious. They are not the "natural and proximate
consequences of the wrongful act" which is the universal rule, but
are remote, future and contingent.
St. Peter's Church v. Beach, 26 Conn. 355, 366 (1857) (Ellsworth, J.).
14. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,
718 (1967).
15. 307 U.S. 161 (1938).
Id. at Electronic
164-65. Press, 1975
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the federal courts. From this power to award attorneys' fees where
equity dictates, three broad, and to some extent overlapping,
theories developed supporting such awards.
The Private Attorney General Doctrine
The first and formerly the most encompassing theory, the
"private attorney general" doctrine, was established in Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises."' Newman involved a class action
brought under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to enjoin
racial discrimination at drive-in restaurants operated by the defendants. A portion of Title II specifically allows the courts, in
their discretion, to award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in suits brought pursuant to the statute.'8 The
Court in Newman interpreted this clause as a manifestation of
congressional intent to insure the enforcement of the Civil Rights
Act. Realizing the problpms of attempting to legislatively end
discrimination, Congress provided an incentive for private litigation by allowing awards of attorneys' fees as the only practical
method of enforcing the Civil Rights Act. Since the only remedy
allowed under the Act was injunctive relief, additional compensation, i.e., awards of attorneys' fees for the party acting as a "private attorney general" in vindicating others' rights, was deemed
necessary." Newman's private attorney general doctrine is applicable, however, only because Congress expressly indicated the
intent to allow shifting of attorneys' fees to the losing party
through 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
This section specifically provides that individuals seeking to vindicate their constitutional rights under the Act should be allowed
to place the cost of their attorneys' fees on the losing party. Numerous cases following Newman interpreted the decision as allowing for the shifting of attorneys' fees onto the losing party whenever the private individual sought to enforce a congressional policy, regardless of whether the statute under which the suit was
brought specifically allowed for shifting of attorney fee awards.2
17. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970) states:
[I]n any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
19. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 309 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968).
20. The private attorney general doctrine has been used in numerous
cases subsequent to Newman to allow the shifting of attorneys' fees onto the
losing party. In the area of civil rights these cases include: Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (Title II Civil Rights Act of
1964); Fowler v. Schwarzwaulder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974) (42 U.S.C.
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The Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society,' has recently ended this judicial expansion of the private
attorney general doctrine.
The Alyeska litigation originally began in March of 1970, when
the Wilderness Society sought to enjoin the Secretary of the In.§ 1983 action by seven blacks enjoining employment of firemen based on
exam performance); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) (suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 for unlawful discrimination by using a false pretext
to refuse to lease an apartment to blacks); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836
(5th Cir. 1972) (suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for discrimination in use of
intelligence test in hiring of city golf pro) ; Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.,
444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971) (42 U.S.C. § 1982 action to stop realtors from
discriminating against blacks in the sale of lots); Alexander v. AVCO Corp.
-Aerospace Structures Division, 380 F. Supp. 1282 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (class
action based on racial discrimination in hiring); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F.
Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excluding
blacks from employment in Department of Public Safety).
Environmental law cases using the private attorney general doctrine
include: La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1974) (suit to enjoin construction of California highway until compliance with statutory provisions for relocation assistance and environmental protection); National
Resources Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st
Cir. 1973) (suit to enforce compliance with Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 et seq).
Prisoner's rights' cases shifting attorneys' fees based on the private
attorney general doctrine include: Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974)
(suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against New Hampshire state prison warden for
denial of procedural safeguards for prisoners) ; accord, Souza v. Travisono,
512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975) (successful challenge to prison regulations
limiting inmates' access to attorneys and law students, upholding use of
private attorney general doctrine, but denying awards of attorneys' fees
based on the eleventh amendment); Incarcerated Men of Allen County v. Fair,
506 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974) (class action by county jail inmates for deprivation of constitutional rights).
Private attorney general cases in the area of teacher's rights include: Stolberg v. Members of the Bd. of Trustees for the State College of Conn., 474 F.2d
485 (2d Cir. 1973) (suit by college professor for reinstatement after termination of employment violating first amendment and due process rights);
Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974) (reinstatement of two black high school teachers wrongfully dismissed by racially
discriminating school board).
Miscellaneous suits also based on the private attorney general doctrine
include welfare litigation, Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th
Cir. 1974) (successfully challenged a Hawaii residency statute that violated
recipients' right to welfare); reapportionment suits, Fairley v. Patterson,
493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974) (challenge to reapportionment plan excluding
college students) ; violations of first amendment rights, Donahue v. Staunton,
471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973) (suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for discharge of chaplain at state mental hospital in violation of chaplain's right to free speech).
21. U.S. , 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975).
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terior from issuing right-of-way and special land use permits for
the Alaskan pipeline as violations of the Mineral Leasing Act and
the National Environmental Policy Act.22 After lengthy litigation,
Congress amended the Mineral Leasing Act to allow permits to be
issued to Alyeska.23 This effectively terminated the litigation on the
merits but left the Wildnerness Society with 4,455 hours of billable attorneys' time.2 4 The court of appeals held that although
there was no specific statutory authorization for an award of attorneys' fees against the defendants, this was a case where the
Wilderness Society had acted to vindicate "important statutory
rights of all citizens"25 thus meriting that half of the fees be
paid by Alyeska 2 6 This decision was appealed to the Supreme
Court where the shifting of fees was denied and a significant constriction of the private attorney general doctrine resulted. The
Court not only held that an award of attorneys' fees was not warranted under the private attorney general doctrine in this case, but
that numerous other decisions in recent years allowing such awards
have been "erroneously decided. 27
In determining that the private attorney general doctrine
must be limited solely to statutory authorizations of fee shifting,
the Court stressed the development of the American rule denying
fee shifting, specifically the applicability of the Act of 18535
limiting awards allowable in federal litigation. The Act of 1853
provided legislation expressly limiting the amounts collectable
from the losing party, and the Court held in Alyeska that this
statute and its successors have not been "retracted, repealed or
22. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970); National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq (NEPA 1969).
23. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), as amended
80 U.S.C. § 185 (1973).
24. 495 F.2d 1026 (1974).
25. Id. at 1032.
26. Id. at 1036.
, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 1678 n.46 (1975), listing those
U.S. 27. See cases held by the Supreme Court to have been erroneously decided, including:
Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d
219 (1st Cir. 1974); Cornist v. Richland Danish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189
(5th Cir. 1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); Taylor
v. Perini, 503 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494
F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973);
La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1972); Donahue v. Staunton,
471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Knight v.
Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (lst Cir. 1972); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
28. 10 STAT. 161 (1853).
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/6
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modified"2 so as to "extend any roving authority to the Judiciary
to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts
might deem them warranted.""0 The holding in Alyeska clearly
eliminates the use of judicially created private attorney general
fee awards and limits such fee shifting to only those cases where the
statute involved specifically warrants that the losing party should
bear the expense of the successful litigant's attorneys' fees. Alyeska
should not be read, however, as destroying the other two existing
equitable doctrines under which attorneys' fees are shifted to the
losing party - the "common fund" theory and the "bad faith"
doctrine.
Common Fund Theory
The "common fund" or "class benefit"'" theory for awarding
attorneys' fees was originally applied in Trustees v. Greenough,2
a suit by a bondholder to end the trustee's misapplication of trust
funds. The bondholder in Greenough, having borne the cost of the
entire litigation, sought to have his litigation expenses, including
attorney's fees, paid out of the trust funds on the theory that his
efforts benefited the entire group of bondholders. The Court, accepting this argument, noted that equity requires the individual
bringing suit be reimbursed for his expenses. Such repayment may
come either from the common fund or proportionately from those
benefited by the suit." In reaching this decision, the Court analyzed
the effect of the Act of 1853," which limits awardable costs in federal litigation. The Court held:
the act contains nothing which can be fairly construed to
deprive the Court of Chancery of its long-established control over the costs and charges of the litigation, to be exercised as equity and justice may require, including proper
allowances to those who have instituted proceedings for
the benefit of a general fund. 5
95 S. Ct. at 1623.
29. U.S. -,
30. Id.
31. Cases awarding attorneys' fees to successful litigants based on the
class benefit theory include: Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (plaintiff furthered interests of union members by vindicating his rights to free speech as
a union member); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)
(plaintiff stockholder's suit benefited entire class of stockholders by enforcing proxy statute); Milburn v. Huecker, 500 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1974)
(plaintiff's successful suit for wrongfully withheld welfare benefits aided all
welfare recipients).
32. 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
33. Id. at 533.
34. Se6 note 28 supra and accompanying text.
U.S.Electronic
at 537.Press, 1975
Produced by35.The 105
Berkeley

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1975], Art. 6

176

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

This determination that the Act of 1853 does not limit the shifting
of attorney fee awards in litigation brought under the common
fund theory consequently saved this means of awarding attorneys' fees from the restrictions placed on such awards in Alyeska.
Because the Court in Greenough was able to separate the limitations of the Act of 1853 from the equitable granting of fees
under the common fund theory, the Court's subsequent holding in
Alyeska followed this determination and left those awards based on
this theory free from further limitations.
The common fund theory has been somewhat expanded since
Greenough to allow awards of attorneys' fees even when there is no
pecuniary benefit to the class. The expansion resulted from Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,3 in which plaintiff stockholders prevailed on the allegation that a merger resulting from the use of
a misleading proxy statement was violative of the Securities Exchange Act. When the Court set the merger aside, an entire class
of stockholders was benefited. The Supreme Court held:
To award attorney's fees in such a suit to a plaintiff who
has succeeded in establishing a class action is not to saddle
the unsuccessful party with the expenses but to impose
them on the class that has benefited from them and that
would have had to pay them had it brought the suit."'
In this case, the defendant-corporation paid the plaintiff's attorney's fees. The effect of this order, however, was to indirectly
assess all stockholders who benefited from the litigation. As a
result, the major consideration in granting awards of attorneys'
fees under this equitable doctrine is to trace the funds paid to
the successful litigant to those who have benefited by the suit.
Other factors often considered in determining the applicability
of the common fund theory include: (1) the number of people
benefited by the plaintiff's efforts; (2) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement; and (3) the strength of the
3 8
congressional policy sought to be enforced.
Bad Faith Theory
The final equitable theory under which federal courts have
awarded attorneys' fees involves a determination of whether the
defendant has acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
36. 396 U.S. 375 (1974).
37. Id. at 396-97.
88. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 488 F.2d 559, 564 (9th Cir. 1973).
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/6
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'
The rationale for awarding fees under this
oppressive reasons."39
doctrine, is that the defendant, whose conduct has forced the plaintiff to institute suit, should pay the costs incident to the litigation." A recent case exemplifying this theory is Gates v. Collier, '
a class action suit brought on behalf of the inmates of the Mississippi State Prison to vindicate their constitutional rights under
the first, eighth and fourteenth amendments. Based on its finding that,
unnecessary delay, extraordinary efforts, and burdensome
expenses incurred incident to the resolution of this case
were occasioned because of defendants' maintenance of
their defense in an obdurately obstinate manner, 2
the Gates court awarded attorneys' fees.
Although Alyeska limited the private attorney general doctrine, it noted expressly that the bad faith and common fund
theories for granting attorneys' fees remain viable. These equitable theories were seen by Alyeska as unquestionable "assertions
of inherent power in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress."" It follows from

39. Walker v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 443 F.2d 33, 37 (7th
Cir. 1971). See also 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77 [2] at 1710 (2d
ed. 1966); F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
For further grounds for awarding attorneys' fees in light of defendant's bad
faith, see Note, Recovery of Attorney's Fees in a Private Civil Rights Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 11 HOUSTON L. REv. 679 (1974). Awards have
been based on defendant's conduct being:
evasive, unyielding, unreasonable, obstinate, willful, obdurate, vexatious, oppressive, patent, callous, defiant, unconscionable, or in bad
faith.

Id. at 683.
40. Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962); Bond v. Stanton,
No. 75-1459 (7th Cir., Jan. 7, 1976); Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir.
1975); accord, Milburn v. Huecker, 500 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1974); Class
v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298
(5th Cir. 1973); Stolberg v. Members of the Bd. of Trustees, 474 F.2d
485 (2d Cir. 1973); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 453 F.2d 259 (6th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972); McEnteggart v. Catalda,
451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.2d
81 (6th Cir. 1968); Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d
494 (4th Cir. 1963); Davis v. School District of City of Pontiac, Inc., 374 F.
Supp. 141 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.
1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D.
Ala. 1972); Shull v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 338 F. Supp.
1376 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972).
41. 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973).
42. Id. at 301.
, Press,
95 S.
Ct.
U.S.
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the Court's analysis and Congress' failure to curtail the use of
the bad faith and common fund doctrines, that they may be
used by litigators to obtain attorneys' fees.
Statutory Awards of Attorneys' Fees
In addition to the use of the common fund and bad faith
theories for shifting attorneys' fees, there exists a substantial
amount of legislation specifically warranting attorney fee awards
in particular types of suits."" Prior to Alyeska, courts had implied
that such fee awards were warranted under a number of statutes
which were silent on the issue. This imposittion was deemed necessary to effectuate Congressional intent."5 For example, attorneys' fees had been granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1982, and
§ 1983 on the ground that these civil rights statutes shared a common goal with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which had, in fact,
specifically allowed for such fees to successful litigants."
44. Statutes specifically providing for awards of attorneys' fees include: Amendments to Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. 93-502, 88 Stat.
1561 § (b) (2) (Nov. 21, 1974) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 522(a)); Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 104(a) (1), 641, 642, 643 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) Tit. II, § 2000e-5(k) Tit. VII (1970); Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914) ; Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) ;
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970); Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1617; Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. 1972);
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) ; Housing and Rent Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1895(a)
(b) (1952); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1970); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970); The Merchant Marine Act of
1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1227; Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1970);
Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §4911(d); Ocean Dumping Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1415(g) (4) (1972); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c); Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970);
Patent Infringement Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970); Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499(g) (b) (1970); Public Accomodations Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) (1970); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970);
Rule 37(a), (c), F. R. CIV. PROC.; Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77K(e);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78: (e), 78r(a); Servicemen's
Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1970); Trust Indenture Act, 15
U.S.C. §77www(a) (1970); Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1640(a)
(1970); Unfair Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970); Water Pollution
Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1973).
45. See note 46 infra.
46. Mears, American Civil Liberties Union pamphlet on Attorney's Fees,
Oct. 19, 1974, emphasizes how 42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1982 and § 1983 strongly
parallel Civil Rights Act of 1964, which does grant fees. See also Note,
Allowance of Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Litigation Where the Action
Is Not Based on a Statute Providing For An Award of Attorney's Fees,
41 U. CINN. L. Rnv. 405 (1972).
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Alyeska, however, by holding that fees may be awarded under
the private attorney general doctrine only where specifically authorized by statute, has effectively eliminated awarding attorneys'
fees by implication. Considering one of the civil rights statutes,
the Court stated:
if any statutory policy is deemed so important that its
enforcement must be encouraged by awards of attorneys'
fees, how could a court deny attorneys' fees to private
litigants in § 1983 actions seeking to vindicate constitutional rights ?'
In essence, the Court has held that only Congress can authorize
awards of attorneys' fees based on the private attorney general
doctrine. Underlying this retrenchment, lies the philosophy that
the courts should not be left to their unguided discretion in determining which statutes require shifting of attorneys' fees to
effectuate Congressional intent. Obviously § 1983 suits would be
important enough to warrant such fee shifting, but it is up to
Congress to specify that such awards should be made.
For cases awarding attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see Cooper
v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972) (discrimination in use of intelligence
test in hiring city golf pro); Jinks v. Mays, 350 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ga. 1972)
(civil rights class action holding nontenured teachers were eligible for maternity leave).
Cases awarding fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1932 include: Knight v. Auciello,
453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) (discrimination in leasing of apartments); Lee
v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971) (suit against real
estate developer for refusal to sell lots to blacks).
Cases awarding fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 include: Bradley v. School Bd.
of the City of Richmond, 42 U.S.L.W. 4703 (U.S. May 15, 1974) (school desegregation) ; Jordon v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974) (challenged Conn.
statute forbidding unemployment benefits for pregnant women); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974) (challenge to Hawaii
residency statute that violated welfare recipient's rights); Stolberg v. Members of the Bd. of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) (suit to gain renewal of professor's teaching contract for discharge violating first amendment rights) ; Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973) (class action to
vindicate prisoners' constitutional rights); accord, Incarcerated Men of Allen
County v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219
(1st Cir. 1974); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Serv.,
374 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp.
18 (N.D. Colo. 1973) (fourth amendment suit against police officers for
unconstitutional search); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd 409 U.S. 942 (1972) (successful reapportionment suit against Alabama
state officials); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
(discrimination in hiring of blacks in Department of Public Safety); Lyle
v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1971) (suit involving the harassment
of blacks by police officers).
U.S.
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It should be noted that most of the statutes specifically warranting attorney fee awards and most of the cases awarding fees
under the judicially created common fund and bad faith
doctrines, are fairly recent.4 This trend to award attorneys'
fees appears to conflict with the eleventh amendment when the
losing party is a state official."" Since fee awards against state
officials would be paid out of the state treasury, the officials
contend that the eleventh amendment is a jurisdictional bar to such
awards. To determine whether the eleventh amendment supports
this contention, a further analysis of the enactment and judicial
interpretation of the eleventh amendment is necessary.
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

History and Interpretation
The eleventh amendment is the embodiment of a limited concept of sovereign immunity." Sovereign immunity was established
in England during the thirteenth century reigns of Henry III and
48 See notes 31, 40 and 44 supra.
49. For cases barring awards of attorneys' fees based on the eleventh
amendment, see Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 1996 (1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1985 (1975); Named Individual Members of
San Antonio Conservation Soc'y. v. Texas Highway Dept., 496 F.2d 1017 (5th
Cir. 1974); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1986 (1975); Harrisburg Coalition Against
Ruining the Environment v. Volpe, 381 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Sincock
v. O'Bara, 320 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Del. 1970).
Cases holding the eleventh amendment is not a bar to awards of attorneys'
fees include: Bond v. Stanton, No. 75-1459 (7th Cir., Jan. 7, 1976) ; Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975); Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137
(1st Cir. 1975); Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975); Class
v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974); Milburn v. Huecker, 500 F.2d 1279
(6th Cir. 1974); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1974);
Incarcerated Men of Allen County v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974);
Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 198 (5th Cir.
1973), petition for rehearing en banc granted, 500 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1974);
Downs v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 65 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Kirkland
v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 374 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Sims v.
Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd 409 U.S. 942 (1972); NAACP
v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
50. Sovereign immunity is explained by Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa
v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907) as
[the] sovereign is exempt from suit . . . on the logical and practical

ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends.
Id. at 353.
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Edward I' The basic premise was that the king, being sovereign,
could not be sued in his own court without his consent. This concept
was brought to America, and before the enactment of the United
States Constitution the individual states could not be sued without
their consent.5 2 The Constitution established the jurisdiction of
the federal courts in Art. III, § 2 which states inter alia that "the
judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity . . .
between a State and Citizen of another State. .. ." This grant of
jurisdiction left open the possibility of suing the individual states.
Although some statesmen realized that the Constitution left this
question open," very few believed a suit against a state was a
possibility due to their common acceptance of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity."
51. Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation,
2 GA. L. REv. 207 (1968).

52.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense
and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of
the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of
every state in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of
this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the
States.
The Federalist No. 81, at 548-49 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). There
also existed a practical reason why the states prior to the adoption of the
United States Constitution could not be sued without their consent-only the
state courts existed.
53. Patrick Henry debating James Madison at the constitutional debates claimed:
[I]f gentlemen pervert the most clear expressions, and the usual
meaning of the language of the people, there is an end of all argument. What says the paper? That it shall have cognizance of controversies between a state and citizens of another state, without discriminating between plaintiff and defendant. What says the honorable
gentleman? The contrary- that the state can only be plaintiff.
When the state is debtor, there is no reciprocity .... Whatl is justice

done to one party and not to the other?
3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 555-56 (J.Elliot ed. 1896).
54. John Marshall at the constitutional debates stated,
I hope that no gentlemen will think that a state will be called at
the bar of the federal court ....

It is not rational to suppose that the

sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is to
enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states.
3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 555-56 (J.Elliot ed. 1896).
James Madison stated, "[i]t is not in the power of individuals to call any
state into court. The only operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish
to bring suit against a citizen it must be brought before the federal court."
Id.byatThe
533.
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In 1793 that possibility became reality when the Supreme
Court in Chisholm v. Georgia" heard its first suit against a state
for payment of a debt. In a four-to-one decision, the Supreme
Court retained jurisdiction and held the state liable for payment
of the debt. The majority opinions did not accept the principle of
sovereign immunity, but rather centered on the lack of any reason
why a person could be called into court, but a state could not.5"
The public outcry after the Chisholm decision was so intense that
it took the United States House of Representatives and the United
States Senate less than a year to prepare the eleventh amendment
for ratification by the necessary twelve states,"' and the concept
of partial sovereign immunity was enacted."
A literal reading of the eleventh amendment discloses that it
prohibits only those suits brought against a state by citizens of
another state, or citizens of a foreign state. The amendment does
not foreclose suits against a state by its citizens. However, the
Supreme Court in Hans v. Louisiana,"' judicially extended the
scope of the eleventh amendment to preclude suits by citizens of
a state against that state, since the purpose of the eleventh
amendment's enactment was to protect the state treasuries from
any action that would deplete their funds.
Even after this judicial expansion, the eleventh amendment
does not enact the total concept of sovereign immunity, but only
limits certain types of suits from being brought against a state
in federal court. The doctrine of sovereign immunity would limit
all suits against the state to prevent interference with government,
while the eleventh amendment is more a means of prohibiting the
federal government, through its courts, from interfering with the
55. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
56. See Justice Wilson's opinion, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 at 456, finding no
difference if an individual, the original sovereign, may be sued for breach
of contract on the payment of a debt, or if an aggregate of individuals making up a state could be sued for breach of the contract.
57. The eleventh amendment passed the Senate on January 14, 1794
by a vote of 23 to 2. 3 Annals of Congress 651-52 (1793). While less than
two months later, on March 4, 1794, the House also passed the amendment
81 to 9. 4 Annals of Congress 29-30 (1794).
58. Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2
GA. L. Rnv. 207, 227 (1968).
59. 134 U.S. 1 (1889) (suit by citizen of state of Louisiana against
that state to collect payment on state bonds). The Supreme Court stated that
the eleventh amendment literally would not preclude this type of suit, but to

allow it would produce the same reaction as Chisholm v. Georgia.
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state governments." Some confusion has resulted in certain court
opinions as6 to whether the eleventh amendment codifies sovereign
immunity, ' or whether it operates as a jurisdictional limitation
on the federal courts.2 The latter interpretation would appear to
be the more proper and accurate since it would conform with
judicial action which allows the eleventh amendment defense to
be raised at any phase of the suit to declare a judgment void for
lack of jurisdiction. In this sense it fulfills the purpose of its
enactment by protecting state treasuries from claims against them,
as in Chisholm." However, the application of the eleventh amendment as a means of protecting the state treasury was significantly
limited by the 1908 Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Young."5
Limitation of the Eleventh Amendment by Ex parte Young
Holding that public officials may be sued for unconstitutional acts, the Court in Ex parte Young, greatly restricted the
parameters of the eleventh amendment as a jurisdictional defense."c
60. By limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear these suits,
the eleventh amendment furthers the principle of separation of powers. Note,
A Practical View Of The Eleventh Amendment -Lower
Court Interpretations and The Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEO. L.J. 1473, 1480 (1972).
61. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971) (the
eleventh amendment codifies sovereign immunity); Ward v. Ackrozd, 344
F. Supp. 1202, 1214 (D. Md. 1972) (the eleventh amendment raises the
defense of sovereign immunity).
62. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (Court held the eleventh
amendment to be a jurisdictional bar that need not be raised in trial court) ;
Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974) (eleventh amendment is an
express jurisdictional limitation on the federal courts).
63.
The eleventh amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit
limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force that
this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment in
this case even though urged for the first time.
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1945).
See also FED. R. Cirv. P. 60(b) (which in effect allows defendant's motion to
vacate orders awarding attorneys' fees as void for lack of jurisdiction).
64. Prior to the enactmcnt of the eleventh amendment, other suits seeking restoration of property taken by the states were pending; but these were
dismissed holding with the purpose of the eleventh amendment to protect the
states pecuniary interests. See Comment, Applicability and Waiver of States
Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 88 HARv. L. REv. 243, 246 (1974), discussing
Vassall v. Massachusetts (unreported case docketed in Supreme Court, Aug.
Term. 1793) (suit seeking restoration of confiscated Loyalist property) ; Hollingsworth v. Virginia (Indiana Co. v. Virginia), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798)
(suit to restore lands legislatively placed in public domain).
65. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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The Minnesota legislature had enacted railroad freight and passenger rate schedules, enforceable by the state's attorney general.
The act contained several penalties for violations of its provisions."7
The railroads immediately sought injunctive relief from the statute's enforcement, arguing that the rates violated their fourteenth
amendment protections. A temporary restraining order was issued
to forestall enforcement of the act by the state's attorney general
Young. Young moved for dismissal claiming the eleventh amendment was a jurisdictional bar when suit was initiated against a
state." Young's motion was denied and when he attempted to
enforce the act, he was held in contempt. Young then filed a writ
of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in
discharging the writ and upholding the contempt order, created
the legal fiction that allowed the action of Young as a state official to constitute state action for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment, but not for purposes of the eleventh amendment. The
eleventh amendment was held not to be a bar to this suit because
a state official acting outside the Constitution is "stripped of his
official or representative character" 9 and is subject to suit in an
individual capacity. Through Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court
carved out a broad exception to the eleventh amendment's coverage by allowing suits to be brought against state officials for
alleged constitutional violations and violations of federal statutes.
The eleventh amendment's original purpose to protect the states
and their treasuries was now opened up for attack in the federal
judiciary.
67. Penalty for violation of passenger rate schedules act was a fine up to
$5,000 or imprisonment up to five years, or both. Penalty for violation of
the commodity rate schedule was imprisonment up to ninety days. Id. at 127-29.
68. The naming of Young as the party defendant merely makes him
the party representing the state, and amounts to making the state a party.
This allows Young to raise the eleventh amendment defense. Although Young
lost his immunity under the eleventh amendment because he was acting
outside the constitution, state officials may always raise the eleventh amendment defense because the state is the real party in interest. See Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), at note 83 infra
and accompanying text.

69.
If the act which the state attorney general seeks to enforce be violative of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under

such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences
of his individual conduct.
Id. at 159-60.
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Although the relief sought in Ex parte Young was injunctive,
the result of the Court's holding was to declare the railroad rate
statute unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment and hold
the state's attorney general in contempt for trying to enforce it.
By nullifying this statute the Supreme Court did affect the state
treasury since the source of revenue that would have been derived
from the future operation of the statute was removed. Subsequent suits brought under the doctrine of Ex parte Young would
enlarge the scope of this effect on state funds. °
Through Ex parte Young, part of the eleventh amendment's
jurisdictional bar was removed, since federal courts were now
granted jurisdiction to hear suits alleging constitutional or federal
statute violations by state officials. In addition to this means of
circumventing eleventh amendment immunity, another avenue has
developed through which the eleventh amendment's immunity is
completely displaced-if there has been a waiver of immunity,
either by statute or by consent.
Waiver of the Eleventh Amendment
Two means exist through which the protective immunity of
the eleventh amendment may be waived. The first, statutory
waiver, is when a statute specifically allows certain awards
against the state. In such a case, the defense of the eleventh amendment will not preclude the award. 7 ' The second means of eliminating eleventh amendment immunity is by finding the state has
consented to the suit.72 The factors determining consent differ,
depending upon the type of statute under which the action arises.
If the action arises solely from state law, the state must have given
"clear consent" before the suit may be brought in federal court."'
70. See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70 (1927) (Court
held that in suits against a state for enforcing unconstitutional statutes the
successful plaintiffs may recover costs against the state, whether the suit be
civil or criminal).
71. See note 44 supra.
72. The state may waive its eleventh amendment immunity by consenting to the suit. See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 564 (1857) (it is
a long established principle that the sovereign cannot be sued without its
consent); Ex parte York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (eleventh amendment
and doctrine of sovereign immunity do not allow suits against a state by its
citizens, citizens of another state, or citizens of a foreign state absent consent). See also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm's., 359 U.S. 275
(1959); Gunther v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906);
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
73. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 328 U.S. 459, 464-66
(eleventh amendment denies federal courts authorization to hear
(1945)

suits brought by individuals against a state without state's clear consent).
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However, if the cause of action arises under a federal statute,
there may be a constructive waiver of immunity depending on the
circumstances. '
The doctrine of constructive waiver was enunciated in Parden
v. Terminal Railway Co., 5 in which the Supreme Court found the
state of Alabama had consented to suit in federal court under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 6 by operating a railroad in interstate commerce. The Court, in determining if the
state had consented to suit by its actions, looked to the statute to
ascertain if Congress intended to allow suits against the states.
The Court found the FELA applied to "every" common carrier,
and that such language was not meant by Congress to preclude
suits under the FELA if the defendant happened to be a state
operated unit."' The rationale of this finding of a constructive
waiver was that the states, in adopting the Constitution, surrendered a portion of their immunity so that whenever the states entered a sphere of activity regulated by Congress under its constitutional powers, the states subjected themselves to enforcement of
that statute in federal court. In Parden, the state of Alabama, by
operating a railroad in interstate commerce "necessarily consented
to such suits as authorized by the Act,"' passed by Congress pursuant to the commerce clause. Thus, a constructive waiver of
eleventh amendment immunity arises,
[w] here a State's consent to suit is alleged to arise from
an act not wholly within its own sphere of authority but
within a sphere-whether it be interstate compacts or
interstate commerce-subject to the constitutional power
of the Federal Government. [T]hen the question whether
the State's act constitutes the alleged consent is one of
federal law.""
The decision in Parden, which would authorize finding a
constructive waiver of the eleventh amendment's immunity whenever the state entered into operations regulated by any statute
passed pursuant to congressional power under the Constitution,
was recently limited by Employees v. Missouri Public Health
Department."° The Supreme Court in Employees, a suit by workers
74. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
75. Id.
76. 35 STAT. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et 8eq. (1970).
77. 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964).
78 Id. at 192.
79. Id. at 196.
80. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
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in state hospitals seeking overtime compensation due them under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),8' failed to find a constructive waiver by the state through its operation of state health
institutions. Although the FLSA was passed by Congress pursuant
to its power under the commerce clause, the Court would not
extend Parden"to cover every exercise by Congress of its commerce
power."'" The Court noted that legislation under the commerce
clause has been quite prolific. Consequently, to hold that every
state operation falling within legislation pursuant to the commerce
clause was a waiver by that state of its eleventh amendment
immunity, would in effect remove most of the sovereignty of the
states. Such a removal of sovereign immunity would cause enormous fiscal consequences to the states; for example, in Employees,
all the workers in state health institutions would be allowed to
sue the state in federal court under the FLSA for overtime compensation. To protect the states' treasuries, Employees limited the
scope within which a constructive waiver of the eleventh amendment may be found.
The result of Employees is not to destroy the doctrine of
constructive waiver, but to limit it to those suits brought under
federal statutes in which Congress implies a waiver of the state's
immunity, as in Parden, by regulating a sphere of activity that if
the state enters, it will be held to have consented to the suit.
Congressional intent, shown either specifically in the language
of the statute, or reasonably implied in viewing the legislation as a
whole, is the key factor in finding a constructive waiver of the
state's eleventh amendment immunity.
The concept of waiver is initially important in all cases attempting to determine if awards of attorneys' fees against a state
are permissible. Finding a waiver would effectively eliminate the
jurisdictional bar of the eleventh amendment and allow an award
of attorneys' fees against state officials. A recent Supreme Court
case, Edelman v. Jordan," examined the waiver doctrine in the
eleventh amendment context. In addition, Edelman discussed what
types of relief are allowable under Ex parte Young where the
eleventh amendment is applicable.
81. 52 STAT. 1056, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
82. 411 U.S. 279, 287 (1973).
83. Berkeley
415 U.S.
651 (1974).
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EDELMAN V. JORDAN AND ITS EFFECTS ON AWARDS OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES

The Edelman Test
Edelman is significant in determining whether the eleventh
amendment bars the award of attorneys' fees since it discusses
the issue of waiver" and the types of relief allowable under
Ex parte Young if the eleventh amendment is not waived."
Edelman was a class action suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
which attempted to secure compliance of Illinois state officials
with regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) for timely processing of benefits
under the federal-state Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled
(AABD) program established by the Social Security Act.8 The
plaintiffs alleged a denial of equal protection and violation of the
Social Security Act due to the untimely processing of their welfare
applications and sought an order compelling payment of the
wrongfully withheld benefits. In its decision, the Supreme Court
analyzed the type of relief permissible under Ex parte Young and
the eleventh amendment. It also determined whether the state had
waived its immunity by participating in this federally funded
program. Each of these discussions were crucial to the 5-4 decision denying payment of retroactive benefits.
In determining whether there had been a waiver, the Court
first examined whether Congress intended that the states waive
their immunity by participating in the AABD program."' By
analyzing the wording of the Social Security Act, the Edelman
Court found no such congressional intent.8 Based upon this con9 and
clusion, the Court distinguished Parden"
Employees,"° both
of which involved federal statutes authorizing suits against a
"general class of defendants which literally included states.. '9 '
The Court also held that mere participation by the state in the
AABD program was not a waiver of immunity. The Court's
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1360-62.
Id. at 1356-59. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1969). Replaced as of January 1, 1974 by

42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1975).
87. The waiver issue is discussed in the Court's opinion after the allowable relief issue, however, for purposes of this analysis they are discussed
inreverse order.
88. 415 U.S. 651, , 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1360-62 (1974).
89. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
90. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
91. The Edelman decision found the Social Security Act did not authorize suit against a class of defendants, including the states. Id. at 1360.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/6

et al.: The Eleventh Amendment: A Bar to Awards of Attorneys' Fees in Sui

1976]

BAR TO AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

189

analysis indicates that the majority in Edelman requires both express congressional authorization allowing the suit to be brought
and a clear state waiver of immunity before the eleventh amendment will be held inapplicable. "2
After holding that the eleventh amendment was applicable,
the Court determined whether the relief requested was proper
under Ex parte Young. In Ex parte Young, the state's attorney
general was enjoined from future enforcement of the rate penalties." This prospective relief differs from the retroactive relief
requested in Edelman. In Edelman, the officials would have been
required to use state funds to compensate for breaches of a
past legal duty to process applications timely. The Court held
that the relief requested in Edelman, if awarded, would be comparable to a monetary recovery against the state which is barred
by the decision of Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury."
Ford involved a suit brought against the state of Indiana for
a refund of taxes wrongfully collected. In holding the eleventh
amendment barred the federal courts from entertaining such a
suit, the Supreme Court stated:
[W] hen the action is in essence one for recovery of money
from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in
interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity
from suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants."
In Edelman, the court of appeals distinguished the damages
sought in Ford from a request for retroactive welfare benefits,"'
by holding Edelman's relief to be a form of "equitable restitution." ' The Supreme Court failed to accept the principle that
the equitable relief sought in Edelman was not barred by the
eleventh amendment for three reasons. First, the Court stated
the relief sought in Ford, a refund of taxes, was more analogous
to equitable restitution than Edelman's payment of welfare benefits. Since Ford's refund had been denied on eleventh amendment
grounds, there should be no difficulty denying the retroactive
92. See also Comment, Applicability and Waiver of State's Eleventh
Amendment Immunity, 88 HARv. L. REV. 243, 249 (1974).
93. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
94. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).

95.
96.

Id. at 464.
415 U.S. 651, -

,94 S. Ct. 1347, 1357 (1974).
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welfare payments."8 Second, previous cases had specifically held
equitable relief to be barred by the eleventh amendment."9 Finally,
even though the relief sought in Edelman was equitable, the Court
stated it was indistinguishable from an award of damages, and
Consequently,
is therefore barred by the eleventh amendment.'
fit
under the
the only remedies allowable against a state must
prospective relief permissible by Ex parte Young."'
Although the Court determined that any type of award against
a state must fit within Ex parte Young, it does not require that
the impact on state treasuries be as restrictive as Young since
relief having a greater effect on state funds has been allowed.' 2
Rather, any effect on state treasuries from compliance with prospective decrees is classified by the Court as a permissible "ancillary effect."'0 3 The result of Edelman is to eliminate effectively
98. In Ford, the taxes would have been refunded because they were
collected under an unconstitutionally imposed taxing statute, so a refund
would be merely restoring the taxpayer to his previous condition; a classic
case of equitable restitution. See 415 U.S. at-,
94 S. Ct. at 1358. In Edelman
if the requested relief had been allowed, the welfare beneficiaries would have
received payments due to them but unconstitutionally delayed by the untimely
processing of their applications. To make such an award would not be restoring
these beneficiaries to their original condition, but allowing them to receive
a monetary compensation wrongfully withheld.
99. Id. at 1357. The Court's opinion specifically refers to Hagood v.
Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886) and In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), suits
against state officials for specific performance on a contract to which the
state was a party, as cases in which the eleventh amendment precluded equitable relief.
100. The Court's determination that payment of retroactive welfare
benefits was "indistinguishable" from an award of damages appears to be
logically tenuous since the basis of such an award would seem to satisfy "the
ascertained needs of impoverished people," Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d
226, 235 (2d Cir. 1972) (McGowan, J.), not merely to compensate for past
injury inflicted by the defendant, which is usually the situation when damages are awarded.
101. Justice Douglas found the practical effect on the state treasuries
from retroactive or prospective decrees to be essentially the same. Both types
of decrees, Douglas states, will effectively deplete state treasuries. 415 U.S.
651, -,
94 S. Ct. 1347, 1357 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). However,
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, held a retroactive award to be more
disruptive since it would deplete a welfare allowance already established by
requiring retroactive payments, invariably making less money available for
the welfare program. Id. at 1357.
102. See 415 U.S. at -,
94 S. Ct. at 1358 citing Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971) (welfare officials required to provide benefits to qualified recipients who were aliens); and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(New York welfare officials could no longer terminate benefits without prior
hearing).
103. Id. at 1358.
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from the Ex parte Young exception any claim for retroactive welfare benefits.
Prior to Edelman, the Supreme Court had summarily affirmed
three other cases similar to Edelman requiring public aid directors
to make retroactive payments."°4 All three cases raised the eleventh
amendment objection; two were summarily decided and the other
did not treat the issue substantively." 5 The Supreme Court overruled these cases to the extent that the relief granted was inconsistent with Edelman. In analyzing the retroactive relief permitted by the lower courts in these cases, the Court concurred
with the opinion of Judge McGowan in Rothstein v. Wyman.' °6
Rothstein was another class action suit by welfare recipients under
the AABD program to obtain retroactive welfare payments. Rothstein noted that although Young provided a means of bringing
a suit of this nature, the available remedies were limited to
those permitted under Young-prospective relief.0 " Judge McGowan held that Young did not provide a means of awarding relief which could be paid only through liquidation of state
funds, unless there was clear congressional intent to allow such
payments from the state treasury. Even in light of the federal
policy to be furthered by retroactive welfare payments in this
case-fulfilling the "fundamental goal of congressional welfare
legislation [which is] the satisfaction of the ascertained needs of
impoverished persons"' 8-there does not appear to be a sufficiently clear showing of congressional intent to allow such payments
from state treasuries. Furthermore, after a passage of time, Judge
McGowan stated, these needs of welfare recipients cannot be remedied by payments of retroactive relief. Rather the effect of such
awards becomes compensatory and of the type specifically barred
by the eleventh amendment."0 The majority in Edelman also
104. State Dept. of Health and Rehabilitation Serv. v. Zarate, 407 U.S.
918 (1972); Sterrett v. Mother's and Children's Rights Organization, 409 U.S.
809 (1972); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
105. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (eleventh amendment

raised but not treated substantively by the Court).
106.

467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972).

107. Id. at 238.
108. Id. at 235.
109. The conclusion of Judge McGowan that the needs of welfare recipients cannot be remedied by payments of retroactive relief because with
the passage of time these needs become compensatory and not remedial was
concurred in by the Court in Edelman despite the fact that it seems to overlook the practical aspects of the welfare recipient's situation. This conclusion

ignores the fact that during the period when the welfare recipient should
have been receiving aid, but was not due to the state's illegal action, bills
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accepted this determination. As a result, courts awarding relief
under the eleventh amendment are left with the following precedent: relief is permissible only when the fiscal consequences to the
state result from compliance with prospective orders, and although
these awards will deplete state treasuries, any effect on the treasuries is merely ancillary. 0 Those cases attempting to award
attorneys' fees against state officials subsequent to Edelman have
attempted to apply this test to circumvent the bar of the eleventh
amendment.
Awarding Attorneys' Fees Under The Edelman Test
Some courts have interpreted Edelman as barring awards
of attorneys' fees against state officials."' These cases have followed the reasoning of Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College,"2 a § 1983 action brought by a professor to
obtain reinstatement and back pay, punitive damages and attorney's fees. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that Skehan
had been wrongfully discharged and remanded the case to determine if the defendant-college was a governmental entity entitled
to eleventh amendment protection. The court of appeals stated
that the award of attorney's fees would be barred if on remand
the college was found to be a governmental unit. Skehan's analysis
of attorneys' fees found that although Edelman did not rule on the
accrued, i.e., rent, utilities, food, which must be paid. It is quite possible that
these bills may remain unpaid at the time in which the recipients finally receive welfare payments, and an award of retroactive relief could still provide
the remedial effect intended. The remedial effect of retroactive welfare payments would seem to only become compensatory after a significant passage
of time.
110. The Court in Edelman stated:
the fiscal consequences to state treasuries

. .

.

were the necessary

result of compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature. State officials, in order to shape their official
conduct to the mandate of the Court's decrees, would more likely
have to spend money from the state treasury than if they had been
left free to pursue their previous course of conduct. Such an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young,
supra.
415 U.S. 651, -,
94 S. Ct. 1347, 1358 (1974).
111. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated
and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1986 (1975) ; Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1996 (1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d
899 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 95 S.Ct. 1985 (1975).
112. 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 95 Ct. 1986
(1975). (Remand based on the Alye8ka decision, not on the eleventh amendment issue).
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matter specifically, the case "appeared to bar the award of attorney's fees from the state treasury......
Skehan referred to language in Justice Marshall's dissent
which stated Edelman did not determine relief allowable under the
fourteenth amendment since suit was brought under a federal
statute.'" Justice Marshall stated:
[T]he court necessarily does not decide whether the
States' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity may
have been limited by the later enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that such a limitation
is necessary to effectuate the purposes of that Amendment.'
In analyzing this statement, Skehan pointed out that three categories exist under which claims can be made against a state. These
are claims based on state law, federal law binding on the states by
the supremacy clause, and claims brought under the fourteenth
amendment binding on the states under section five which enables
Congress to create remedies to protect fourteenth amendment
rights."' Within this framework Justice Marshall was technically
correct that Edelman did not dispose of relief allowable under
the fourteenth amendment since Edelman was brought under
the second category-the Social Security Act. However, Skehan
did not accept Justice Marshall's position because Edelman had
specifically overruled three cases granting relief under the fourteexth amendment where the relief did not meet the Edelman
test."' As a result, the Skehan court found Edelman to govern
claims allowable under all three categories regardless of the limiting effect this could have on permissible remedies under the fourteenth amendment."'
At this point the Skehan court ended its analysis, failing to
determine if awards of attorneys' fees met the prospective monetary relief allowable under Edelman. Rather, the court merely
concluded attorneys' fees and back pay are both types of relief
are barred if the defendant is a governmental entity able to
113. Id. at 42.
114.

415 U.S. 651,

-,

94 S. Ct. 1347, 1371 (1974).

115. Id.
116. 501 F.2d 31, 42 n.7 (3d Cir. 1974).
117. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); State Dept. of Health
and Rehabilitation Serv. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972); Wyman v. Bowens,
397 U.S. 49 (1970).
501 F.2d
31, 42
(3d1975
Cir. 1974).
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invoke eleventh amendment immunity. The Sixth Circuit has
similarly adopted this analysis and interpreted Edelman as barring awards of attorneys' fees solely on the ground that such
awards impose a claim that must be paid out of public funds."'
Although Skehan's conclusion is generally accurate '2" that the
allowable relief test enunciated in Edelman governs all types of
claims against a state treasury-claims based on state law, federal
law and claims brought under the fourteenth amendment-Skehan's holding that the Edelman test bars awards of attorneys'
fees is incorrect. The Edelman test will permit awards against
the state which are prospective, remedial and ancillary in nature.
A number of cases subsequent to Edelman have awarded attorneys' fees against state officials by finding these awards prospective, remedial and ancillary.'21
In Class v. Norton,'2 2 the Second Circuit ordered Connecticut
state welfare officials to comply with federal regulations for
timely processing of applications. The court noted that the de119. See Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974), cert denied,
95 S. Ct. 1996 (1975) (§ 1983 reapportionment action) ; Taylor v. Perini, 503
F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1985 (1975) (§ 1983
action to vindicate inmates' constitutional rights).
120. Strong arguments may be asserted showing that fourteenth amendment rights should not be limited by the previous enactment of the eleventh
, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1371
amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); General Oil Co. v. Grain, 209 U.S. 211,
226-27 (1908) (if the eleventh amendment is held to bar suits against state
officials "it must be evident that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be nullified as to much of its
operation."); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 331 (1885) (more recent
amendments control when two amendments conflict. "It is the last declared
will of the law-maker [that] has paramount force and effect."); Graham,
The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371
(1938) (historical argument asserting the eleventh amendment should not
limit the remedies of the fourteenth amendment since the framers of the
Constitution believed the rights of the fourteenth amendment already existed
by virtue of the privileges and immunities clause and the Bill of Rights);
Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment - Lower Court Interpretations and the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 Gao. L.J. 1473, 1475 (1972)
(the eleventh amendment is not an unconditional recognition of absolute sovereignty of the states, but must be read with the rest of the Constitution so the
eleventh amendment is not read to nullify other provisions of the Constitution).
121. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975); Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974); Jordon v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.
1974); Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, 65 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Pa.
1974). See generally note 49 supra.
122. 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974).
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fendant officials in meeting this order will deplete the state
treasury prospectively because they will be processing the applications faster in the future to meet federal regulations. In Class,
the court, exercising its equitable discretion identified in Sprague,
allowed the award of attorneys' fees since the court held it has at
most an ancillary effect on the state treasury permissible under
Edelman.'2 3 Clearly to classify awards of attorneys' fees as ancillary is correct, since such fees are often minimal and merely an
attached cost of bringing the suit, having less of a financial effect
on the state treasury than the court's order for timely processing
will have in depleting funds. 2 " The Class court further stressed
the "forward-looking deterrent nature" of an award of attorneys'
fees."2 5 Such an award would tend to reinforce compliance with
the decree by the threat of further awards of attorneys' fees if
additional suits to force compliance with the decree are necessary.
Under this analysis, the fee awards themselves have a prospective

remedial effect. The Class court held that even if the effect of the
attorneys' fee award was more than ancillary, the award could
still be made because it meets the prospective requirement of
the Edelman test.'26

Under the Class decision and other recent decisions, 2 " attor123. Class, in holding attorneys' fees to be ancillary, is in accord with a
prior Second Circuit decision, Jordon v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974), in
which the court stated:
[I]t appears to us that the allowance awarded here, as part of an
order granting injunctive relief, has at most the "ancillary effect on
the state treasury" which Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 415 U.S. at
669, characterizes as "a permissible and often inevitable consequence
of the principle announced in Ex parte Young."
Id. at 651. See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975) (the
most recent Second Circuit decision finding the eleventh amendment does not
bar awards of attorneys' fees).
124. See Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, 1139 (1975) (suit by Rhode
Island inmates successfully challenging prison regulations limiting access to
attorneys which in awarding attorneys' fees over the eleventh amendment
objection stated, "fees are incidental to the main litigation, which, being for
injunctive and declaratory relief, was permissible under the Eleventh Amendment. An award of attorney's fees is perhaps so 'ancillary' as to be constitutional, even though there will be some drain on the state treasury.").
125. 505 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1974).
126. Id.
127. Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, 65 F.R.D. 557 (E.D. Pa.
1974), specifically asserted this reasoning by stating:
[W]e believe that an award of counsel fees is both clearly remedial
and an integral part of a decree providing for prospective relief from
violations of federal statutory and/or constitutional rights. In light
theBerkeley
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ney fee awards are viewed as an incentive to accomplish future
compliance with federal statutes or to vindicate constitutional
rights. In these decisions, awards of attorneys' fees are clearly
remedial rather than compensatory. This view of attorney fee
awards fully meets the requirements of the Edelman test since the
remedial effect is a prospective result of the order having at most
a permissible ancillary depletion of the state treasury.
Rather than asserting that attorney fee awards are prospective, remedial and ancillary in nature under the Edelman test,
other courts have held that such awards are not barred by the
eleventh amendment because they are analogous to awards of court
costs. In Fairmont Creamery Co. v.Minnesota,'2 8 a suit to enjoin
officials from enforcing a conviction under an unconstitutional
state statute, the Supreme Court held that a state could be taxed
court costs in criminal as well as civil cases just as any other litigant. Although the state had argued costs could not be awarded
against a sovereign, the Supreme Court found that costs are incidental to the hearing and not protected against by the state's
sovereign immunity as long as the federal court has jurisdiction
over the main action. The supremacy clause gives the federal
courts this right to limit a state's sovereignty and to award costs
against the state as one of the incidents of hearing the case. From
the federal courts' ability to award costs against the states despite
eleventh amendment immunity, attorney fee awards can be upheld
in suits against state officials as being an award analogous to an
award of costs.
Several recent cases have based their awards of attorneys'
fees on this analogy of costs and fee awards.'29 These cases stress
the fact that attorney fees are incidental costs incurred in the
course of litigation. Costs are "not awarded for accrued liability"'3 0
but instead are awarded as litigation expenses. Attempts to distinguish awards of costs and awards of attorneys' fees would seem to
disregard the obvious similarity both awards have as litigation
suits are most frequently brought and the expense of litigation, the
fiscal impact of such awards upon the state treasury must be considered an inevitable, and so a permissible, consequence of the principle of Ex parte Young, if that principle is to have any practical
impact.
Id. at 561.
128. 275 U.S. 70 (1927).
129. See Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st
Cir. 1974). Accord, Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975); Sousa
v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975).
130. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1029 (1st
Cir. 1974).
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expenses, '"generically"'' 1 and "analytically."'" 2 The result of this
argument is to find attorneys' fee awards permissible against state
officials since Fairmont upheld awards of costs against states
in spite of eleventh amendment considerations.
The conclusion that attorneys' fees are similar to awards of
court costs was made in Sims v. Amos,' 3 a reapportionment suit
awarding attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs after finding the Alabama legislature's deliberate failure to act had necessitated the
litigation. In making its determination, the court added in footnote
eight:
Individuals who, as officers of a state, are clothed with
some duty with regard to a law of the state which contravenes the Constitution of the United States, may be
restrained by injunction, and in such a case the state has
no power to impart to its officers any immunity from such
injunction or from its consequences, including the court
costs incident thereto, (emphasis added). Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908).' 3
Since Sims was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1972,
numerous cases have followed the Sims' assertion that attorney fee
awards are allowable against state officials even when the eleventh
amendment defense is raised.'35 Even in cases subsequent to Edelman (which was decided in 1974) courts continue to use the summary affirmance of Sims as a basis for their decision. These
courts however, only go so far as to say attorneys' fees are court
costs incident to injunctive relief allowable under Ex parte Young.
Although such an analogy is correct, a more definite decision
would be to determine that attorneys' fees are allowable not only
because they are costs but also because they are a prospective,
remedial and ancillary award permissible under the Edelman test.
131. Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, 1140 (1st Cir. 1975).
132. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1029 (1st
Cir. 1974).

133.
134.

340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
Id. at 694 n.8 (M.D. Ala. 1972).

135.

Pre-Edelman cases following Sims: La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 488

F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1974); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala.
1972); Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973); Brandenburger v.
Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1973).
Post-Edelman cases still following Sims: Bond v. Stanton, No. 75-1459
(7th Cir., Jan. 7, 1976); Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975);
Milburn v. Huecker, 500 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1974); Incarcerated Men of
Allen County v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974); Kirkland v. State Dep't
F. Supp.
374 Press,
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The main weakness in relying solely on Sims to grant awards
of attorneys' fees is that although the analogy to costs is a strong
factor supporting the appropriateness of such awards, the analogy
was only asserted in a footnote, and the case itself was only summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. Summary affirmances
often have little precedential value in guiding the outcome of a
hearing on the issue."' So although Sims presents some precedent
for the award of attorneys' fees against state officials, stronger
precedents can be found in cases following Class because they base
their awards on the type of relief allowed by Edelman.
CONCLUSION
The trend to find exceptions to the American rule and shift
attorneys' fees to the losing party has created the issue of whether
or not such attorney fee awards are allowable under the restraints
the eleventh amendment places on claims against the state treasuries. Obviously, this issue only arises when the defendant is a state
official entitled to the jurisdictional immunity of the eleventh
amendment and where the eleventh amendment has not been
statutorily waived or clear consent to the suit given by the state.
But this issue has been increasingly presented due to the increase
in litigation against state officials after Ex parte Young. When
Ex parte Young opened the door to suits against state officials in
federal court, it also opened the way for claims against state
treasuries. The types of claims that are allowable was recently
clarified by Edelman which held Ex parte Young meant to allow
those awards that result from orders that are prospective in nature
and thus have only an ancillary effect on the state treasury.
Cases attempting to determine if awards of attorneys' fees
against state officials fit within the Edelman test, such as Skehan,
have often failed to analyze clearly the type of award attorney feeshifting presents. Other cases like Sims, have only cursorily treated
the issue by analogizing attorneys' fees to costs. The proper discussion of attorney fee awards would not only emphasize their
similarity to costs but their prospective ancillary nature as well.
Although the circuits currently remain divided on this issue, more
recent decisions tend to present the correct result, which is to
state that attorney fee awards are not barred by the eleventh
amendment, since they are merely incidental costs to litigation,
prospective in nature and having at most an ancillary effect on the
state treasury.
136. 18 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.401[2], at 13-14 (Supp. 1973)
(summary affirmances frequently prove to be a shaky guide to the later out-

come of full consideration of the issue).
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